Weekend Greenwich

An F&B brand whose renewal and department-store expansion I am leading as a freelance brand director

Role
Brand Director (Freelance)
Duration
Mar 2026 – present
Commitment
3 days a week
Scope
Menu, packaging, pricing

200–300%

Dessert category revenue growth

It opened in 2023 as a New York–style café and found its footing, but after passing through several hands its signature menu and brand identity had blurred. I joined to reassemble the brand through data and menu structure.

Cookies cooling on wire racks, each tray labelled by flavour in handwriting

Reassembled on Data

The Toss POS terminal on the counter, the café's tables and windows behind it
Toss POS brought in
A cost and recipe sheet, deliberately blurred
Operating records (details withheld)

Cases

01

Reassembled on data, not instinct

Data first
The first thing I did after joining was bring in the Toss POS and start recording revenue and menu data, with a data review every month. It changed the basis for decisions from “a feeling” to “a record.”
Menu structure
I fixed the standing menu after checking the full inventory, then turned leftover ingredients into guerrilla event items announced on Instagram. Stock gets used up, and customers get a reason to come in.
Drinks rework
Once I had POS revenue data over three months and one month, I pulled any drink selling fewer than 10 times a week. As the menu got simpler, ordering got simpler with it.
Brunch
Given the location and the size of the shop, brunch requests kept coming in. It wasn’t a quantitative metric, but the frequency of spoken requests confirmed the need, so I designed the menu within what the current kitchen could actually produce and made the menu sheet itself. Extending the opening hours and rearranging staffing brought in a new morning crowd.
Result
Dessert category revenue grew 200–300% · a new morning customer base

02

The butter-tteok pop-up — between a hit and a failure

Learning the channel
Running 2 pop-ups across 3 department stores plus 1, I learned the distribution structure from scratch — pitching for a spot and submitting the proposal, and the vendor companies that sit between a department store and a shop (typically ~6% vendor fee, ~15% department store).
Situation
The biggest lesson came from a failure. In the middle of the viral dessert wave at the time, and at the department store’s strong request, we went in with a single-item butter-tteok pop-up.
Week 1
People lined up to buy it, and we ran short on quantity every day.
Scaling up
In week 2 we signed to expand the pop-up to 3 locations, and since our own output couldn’t cover it we switched to factory production — a contract signed after checking the samples.
Collapse
The factory’s mass-produced goods were clearly lower in quality than the samples, and in the meantime the viral moment cooled before it lasted two weeks. After ending the contract early, I rented a workspace and produced through the night myself to hold the department store delivery schedule. Labor, logistics, equipment costs and leftover stock on top — a painful loss.
Anatomy of the failure
① Raw material variance — flour is uniform, but glutinous rice flour differs in particle size and moisture by manufacturer, which made quality hard to predict. ② Production bottleneck — 30 minutes to bake; the ingredient cost was low but the time cost was high. ③ Irreversible pricing — the consumer price was locked to the low starting price of the viral phase, so the margin structure couldn’t be walked back. ④ Demand has a shelf life — viral demand cooled faster than a supply chain could be built.
In one sentence
I learned through a loss that what decides a business is not how appealing the product is, but the structure of production, price, and demand.

03

What transferred, and what didn’t

Transferred
From Bakeshop, I connected the supplier network (ingredients, packaging) directly, which cut setup costs, and reused the process of costing out and then deriving the right price. The standard for composing a menu is the same too — it has to keep, cost little, and be producible on a fixed schedule.
Didn’t transfer
Bakeshop’s formula for regulars doesn’t work here. A director rather than an owner has different latitude in service, three days a week means a different density of rapport, and a trade area built around customers arriving by car has a different repeat-visit structure than a neighborhood one. The same know-how has to be redesigned when the context changes — the most design-like lesson I took from operations.
Still open
In a non-resident director setup, ordering authority and execution sit apart, so inventory loss keeps recurring. It remains a question of authority structure — one a system rework alone doesn’t solve.

Anatomy of the Butter-Tteok Failure

Week 1 — the queue at the department store pop-up
Boxed butter-tteok stacked on the pop-up counter behind BUTTER DDEOK price cards
The pop-up display
Butter-tteok boxed and bagged on a prep table, each bag tagged BUTTER DDEOK
Packed for delivery
The BUTTER DDEOK pop-up counter stacked with boxed tteok under its price cards and standing sign
The pop-up booth

Distribution Expansion

The full department store booth seen down the food hall aisle, staff restocking behind it
The department store booth

Takeaway

Three days a week, I am still running this brand and working through the open questions above. Producing results inside someone else’s business, with limited authority and limited time — that is what this project is teaching me.

The brand where the operating instinct started — Wizzy Bakeshop